In this paper, we provide a framework to analyze the information disclosure and information quality choice in the oligopoly in which one firm has the opportunity to choose her information quality flexibly and then decide her information disclosure rule after she has observed her information. We find that in the Cournot (Bertrand) competition, when the goods are substitutes (complements) and the degree of substitution (complement) is small enough, the firm will choose the maximal information quality. However, if the degree of substitution (complement) is large enough, the information quality is some intermediate value. On the other hand, in the Cournot (Bertrand) competition, when the goods are complements (substitutes), the maximal information quality will be chosen. We also find that the Fully Revealing case in which the probability of information disclosure is one will occur in (i) the Cournot competition with sufficiently small degree of substitution; (ii) the Cournot competition when goods are complements; (iii) the Bertrand competition when goods are substitutes; (iv) the Bertrand competition with sufficiently small degree of complements. Moreover, we show that the No Revealing case in which the probability of information disclosure is zero will never show up. (C) 2019 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
