Is the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism conditioned by the financial system? The cases of Chile and Spain

被引:9
作者
Saona, Paolo [1 ]
Vallelado, Eleuterio [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Valladolid, Dept Financial Econ & Accounting, E-47011 Valladolid, Spain
关键词
CAPITAL STRUCTURE; AGENCY COSTS; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; CORPORATE-FINANCE; STOCK MARKETS; PUBLIC DEBT; CHOICE; GROWTH; FIRM; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1080/00036840701736065
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We test whether the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism is conditioned by the financial system in which firms operate. Our results indicate that the legal and institutional environment determines the use of bank debt to finance growth opportunities. Firms use bank debt to finance their growth opportunities when the country's banking system contributes to solving agency and asymmetric information problems and avoiding information monopoly costs. The evolutionary process of the financial systems in each country means that market imperfections such as information asymmetry or agency costs can have a diverse influence on firms' bank debt decisions.
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页码:1709 / 1726
页数:18
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