Remembering Possible Times: Memory for Details of Past, Future, and Counterfactual Simulations

被引:4
作者
De Brigard, Felipe [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
Gessell, Bryce [1 ,5 ]
Yang, Brenda W. [2 ,3 ]
Stewart, Gregory [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Marsh, Elizabeth J. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Dept Philosophy, 203A West Duke Bldg, Durham, NC 27517 USA
[2] Duke Univ, Dept Psychol & Neurosci, 203A West Duke Bldg, Durham, NC 27517 USA
[3] Duke Univ, Ctr Cognit Neurosci, 203A West Duke Bldg, Durham, NC 27517 USA
[4] Duke Univ, Duke Inst Brain Sci, 203A West Duke Bldg, Durham, NC 27517 USA
[5] Southern Virginia Univ, Dept Philosophy, Buena Vista, VA USA
关键词
episodic future thinking; episodic counterfactual thinking; mental simulation; episodic memory; time; SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE; EPISODIC MEMORIES; FUNCTIONAL THEORY; EVENTS; THINKING; YOUNGER; UNIQUE;
D O I
10.1037/cns0000220
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
People's capacity to mentally simulate future events (episodic future thinking) as well as what could have occurred in the past but did not (episodic counterfactual thinking) critically depends on their capacity to retrieve episodic memories. All 3 mental simulations are likely adaptive in that they involve rehearsing possible scenarios with the goal of improving future performance. However, the extent to which these mental simulations are useful at a later time depends on how well they are later remembered. Unfortunately, little is known about how such simulations are remembered. In the current study, we explored this issue by asking participants to retrieve episodic memories and generate future and counterfactual simulations in response to 4 cues: particular places. people, objects, and times. A day later participants received 3 of the 4 cues and were aslaxl to recall the remaining 1. Our results indicate that people and locations are equally well remembered. regardless of the temporal orientation of the mental simulation. In contrast, objects in future simulations are recalled less frequently than are those in memories. Time was poorly remembered across conditions but especially when remembering a future or a counterfactual simulation. In light of these results, we discuss how temporal information may be incorporated into our hypothetical episodic simulations.
引用
收藏
页码:331 / 339
页数:9
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