In-house competition, organizational slack, and the business cycle

被引:4
作者
Kerschbamer, R
Tournas, Y
机构
[1] Univ Vienna, Dept Econ, A-1010 Vienna, Austria
[2] Univ Innsbruck, Dept Econ, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria
[3] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London EC1V 7RR, England
[4] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Econ, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 USA
关键词
competition; organizational slack; capacity; demand uncertainty;
D O I
10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00185-X
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Multiplant firms pit their facilities against each other for production assignments. The present paper studies the consequences of this practice in a model where production is limited by capacity constraints and asymmetric information allows facilities to accumulate slack. It shows the amount of slack per unit of output to be pro-cyclical. Indeed, as capacity constraints become more acute in economic booms, the power of in-house competition for quota assignments is reduced and slack per unit of output increases, while the opposite is true in downturns. Moreover, in downturns firms may use higher cost facilities even when lower cost plants are not running at capacity since this boosts X-efficiency in low-cost plants. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:505 / 520
页数:16
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