Partisan bias in inflation expectations

被引:9
作者
Bachmann, Oliver [1 ]
Gruendler, Klaus [2 ]
Potrafke, Niklas [2 ]
Seiberlich, Ruben [1 ]
机构
[1] ZHAW Sch Management & Law, St Georgen Pl 2, CH-8401 Winterthur, Switzerland
[2] Univ Munich, Ifo Ctr Publ Finance & Polit Econ, Poschingerstr 5, D-81679 Munich, Germany
关键词
Inflation expectations; Partisan bias; Political ideology; Voters' perceptions; Blinder-Oaxaca; US president; MACROECONOMIC POLICY; GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY; POLITICAL-IDEOLOGY; MONETARY-POLICY; DISCRIMINATION; PERCEPTIONS; BEHAVIOR; ECONOMY; MODELS; CYCLES;
D O I
10.1007/s11127-019-00741-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine partisan bias in inflation expectations. Our dataset includes inflation expectations of the New York Fed's Survey of Consumer Expectations over the period June 2013 to June 2018. The results show that inflation expectations were 0.46% points higher in Republican-dominated than in Democratic-dominated US states when Barack Obama was US president. Compared to inflation expectations in Democratic-dominated states, inflation expectations in Republican-dominated states declined by 0.73% points when Donald Trump became president. We employ the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method to disentangle the extent to which political ideology and other individual characteristics predict inflation expectations: around 25% of the total difference between inflation expectations in Democratic-dominated versus Republican-dominated states is based on how partisans respond to changes in the White House's occupant (partisan bias). The results also corroborate the belief that voters' misperceptions of economic conditions decline when the president belongs to the party that voters support.
引用
收藏
页码:513 / 536
页数:24
相关论文
共 60 条
[1]   Who voted for Brexit? Individual and regional data combined [J].
Alabrese, Eleonora ;
Becker, Sascha O. ;
Fetzer, Thiemo ;
Novy, Dennis .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2019, 56 :132-150
[2]   MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A 2-PARTY SYSTEM AS A REPEATED GAME [J].
ALESINA, A .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (03) :651-678
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2017, 6517 CESIFO
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2018, Historical Presidential Election Information by State
[5]  
Armantier O., 2013, Introducing the FRBNY Survey of Consumer Expectations: Survey Goals, Design and Content
[6]  
Armantier O., 2016, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, V800
[7]   DETERMINATION OF THE PUBLIC DEBT [J].
BARRO, RJ .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (05) :940-971
[8]   ARE GOVERNMENT BONDS NET WEALTH [J].
BARRO, RJ .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1974, 82 (06) :1095-1117
[9]   Beyond the running tally: Partisan bias in political perceptions [J].
Bartels, LM .
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, 2002, 24 (02) :117-150
[10]   Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries [J].
Belke, Ansgar ;
Potrafke, Niklas .
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE, 2012, 31 (05) :1126-1139