Arms trade, arms control, and security: Collective action issues

被引:9
作者
Sandler, T [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ So Calif, Sch Int Relat, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
关键词
arms trade; arms control; arms production; collective action; game theory; exploitation hypothesis; arms races; offsets;
D O I
10.1080/10430710008404964
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article puts forth collection action as a unifying theme for the conference essays on arms trade, control, and production. For each of these topics, collective action failures are related to group size and group composition considerations. Other issues are also examined including the manner in which individual contributions determine the overall level of the associated collective good - the so-called aggregation technology of public supply. Based on alternative aggregation technologies, the game-theoretic underpinnings of these arms issues are explored.
引用
收藏
页码:533 / 548
页数:20
相关论文
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