THE ROLE OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE STEERING OF EXECUTIVE AGENCIES

被引:9
作者
Askim, Jostein [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oslo, Dept Polit Sci, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
关键词
executive governance; Norway; performance contracts; performance management; state agencies; GOVERNMENT; CONTRACTS;
D O I
10.1080/15309576.2015.1006463
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
This article analyzes the Norwegian state administration's performance management practices, based on a study of performance contracts between 77 Norwegian executive agencies and their parent ministries. The results show that most performance objectives target agency outputs and outcomes, suggesting that the right version of performance management is practiced. Two perspectives are developed to hypothesize about performance management's relationship to legal, fiscal, legal, and direct behavioral steering. The layering perspective assumes that ministries use performance management to repair gaps left by limitations in the other control instruments. The imbedding perspective assumes that ministries develop performance management practices that uphold intentions for delegated autonomy. The layering perspective receives some support, but overall it seems that decisions about how to use each governance instrument are quite disjointed, without much concern for harmony with how other instruments are used. The article also shows that performance management practices are influenced by contextual factors like the number of tasks an agency performs, organizational heterogeneity, and whether an agency was established before or after the general introduction of performance management.
引用
收藏
页码:365 / 394
页数:30
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