How should China prioritize the deregulation of electricity prices in the context of carbon pricing? A computable general equilibrium analysis

被引:17
作者
Zhang, Kun [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Yao, Yun-Fei [1 ,4 ]
Liang, Qiao-Mei [1 ,2 ,3 ,5 ]
Saren, Gaowa [1 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Inst Technol, Ctr Energy & Environm Policy Res, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[2] Beijing Inst Technol, Sch Management & Econ, 5 South Zhongguancun St, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[3] Beijing Key Lab Energy Econ & Environm Management, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[4] Sinopec, Sinopec Res Inst Petr Engn, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China
[5] Sustainable Dev Res Inst Econ & Soc Beijing, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[6] State Power Investment Cent Res Inst SPICRI, Beijing 102209, Peoples R China
基金
国家重点研发计划; 中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Carbon pricing; Electricity pricing reform; Price deregulation; Abatement cost; EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM; DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS; ECONOMIC-IMPACT; TAX; ENERGY; SCHEME; MITIGATION; COVERAGE; POLICY; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105187
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
China formally launched a national carbon trading market in the power sector in 2017. However, electricity prices in China are still subject to government regulation, which reduces the cost-effectiveness of the carbon pricing policy. This study uses a computable general equilibrium model to explore how China's electricity prices can be deregulated in two stages in the context of implementing carbon pricing in the electricity sector. The results show that under different government policy objectives, the choice of electricity price deregulation is different. If the government intends to significantly reduce marginal abatement costs and promote carbon emission reductions, the electricity price deregulation of non-key electricity consumption sectors should be prioritized in the first stage and that of the national protected sectors in the second stage. Conversely, if the government intends to reduce GDP losses, households' disposable income, and welfare losses effectively, the liberalization of the electricity prices of key electricity consumption sectors should be prioritized in the first stage and that of the household sector in the second stage. Taking 50% of the reduction targets in the electricity sector as an example, if the key electricity consumption sectors and households are prioritized, GDP losses are reduced by 3.6% and 13%, respectively. The results of this study provide new information for China to implement electricity market reform in the context of carbon pricing. China formally launched a national carbon trading market in the power sector in 2017. However, electricity prices in China are still subject to government regulation, which reduces the cost-effectiveness of the carbon pricing policy. This study uses a computable general equilibrium model to explore how China's electricity prices can be deregulated in two stages in the context of implementing carbon pricing in the electricity sector. The results show that under different government policy objectives, the choice of electricity price deregulation is different. If the government intends to significantly reduce marginal abatement costs and promote carbon emission reductions, the electricity price deregulation of non-key electricity consumption sectors should be prioritized in the first stage and that of the national protected sectors in the second stage. Conversely, if the government intends to reduce GDP losses, households' disposable income, and welfare losses effectively, the liberalization of the electricity prices of key electricity consumption sectors should be prioritized in the first stage and that of the household sector in the second stage. Taking 50% of the reduction targets in the electricity sector as an example, if the key electricity consumption sectors and households are prioritized, GDP losses are reduced by 3.6% and 13%, respectively. The results of this study provide new information for China to implement electricity market reform in the context of carbon pricing. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页数:13
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