Alarmist decisions with divergent risk information

被引:102
作者
Viscusi, WK [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-0297.00248
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Receipt of multiple sources of risk information ideally should foster sounder decisions under uncertainty. This paper's original survey results for environmental risks suggest that the learning process is reasonable in many respects, bur it does not accord with a rational Bayesian learning model. Divergent risk assessments from different sources produce extreme violations of rationality, as there is inordinate weight on the high risk assessment. This alarmist reaction holds for both government and industry information sources. This phenomenon may account for the commonly observed phenomenon of public overreaction to highly publicised risks.
引用
收藏
页码:1657 / 1670
页数:14
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