Standard state-space models preclude unawareness

被引：103
作者：
Dekel, E
Lipman, BL
Rustichini, A
机构：
[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, Evanston, IL 60091 USA
[2] Univ Western Ontario, Social Sci Ctr, Dept Econ, London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada
[3] Tilburg Univ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
来源：
ECONOMETRICA | 1998年 / 66卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2998545
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码：159 / 173
页数：15
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