Putting the "Con" into Constitutions: The Economics of Prison Gangs

被引:56
作者
Skarbek, David [1 ]
机构
[1] George Mason Univ, Dept Econ, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
关键词
OPTIMAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT; ORGANIZED-CRIME; SOCIAL DISTANCE; FAMILIA;
D O I
10.1093/jleo/ewn021
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the internal governance institutions of criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of the La Nuestra Familia prison gang. To organize effectively within the confines of penitentiaries, the gang needs to provide a credible commitment for member safety to potential entrants and a means of preventing predation and misconduct within the gang. I analyze the governance structure outlined in the gang's written constitution and show how it solves the collective action problems associated with multilevel criminal enterprises. (JEL D23, K42, L23, P16)
引用
收藏
页码:183 / 211
页数:29
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