Stochastic n-person Prisoner's Dilemma: the Time-Consistency of Core and Shapley Value

被引：0

作者：

Grinikh, Aleksandra L. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] St Petersburg State Univ, 7-9 Univ Skaya Nab, St Petersburg 199034, Russia

来源：

CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL XII | 2019年 / 12卷

关键词：

n-person prisoner's dilemma; coalition; dynamic game; core; Shapley value; time consistency;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

A cooperative finite-stage dynamic n-person prisoner's dilemma is considered. The time-consistent subset of the core is proposed. The the Shapley value for the stochastic model of the n-person prisoner's dilemma is calculated in explicit form.

引用

页码：151 / 158

页数：8