KNOWLEDGE AND SAFETY

被引:47
作者
Kelp, Christoph [1 ]
机构
[1] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Louvain, Belgium
关键词
LUCK;
D O I
10.5840/jpr_2009_1
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This paper raises a problem for so-called safety-based conceptions of knowledge: It is argued that none of the versions of the safety condition that can be found in the literature succeeds in identifying a necessary condition on knowledge. Furthermore, reason is provided to believe that the argument generalizes at least in the sense that there can be no version of the safety condition that does justice to the considerations motivating a safety condition whilst, at the same time, being requisite for knowledge.
引用
收藏
页码:21 / 31
页数:11
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