The Stakes of Losing Office, Term Limits and Democracy

被引:28
作者
Baturo, Alexander [1 ]
机构
[1] Dublin City Univ, Sch Law & Govt, Dublin 9, Ireland
关键词
ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT;
D O I
10.1017/S0007123409990056
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Some presidents facing term limits attempt - often successfully - to scrap tenure restrictions, while others step down when constitutionally required. Whether democratic, partly democratic or non-democratic, there is considerable variation among electoral regimes as to whether presidents respect term limits. This article focuses on what is at stake for a president required to leave the highest political office. It argues that for a given level of executive constraints, the value of holding political office in polities with large public sectors and prevalent corruption, combined with the probability of retaining assets and immunity after leaving office, influences whether presidents attempt to overstay their tenure.
引用
收藏
页码:635 / 662
页数:28
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