Testing guilt aversion

被引：154

作者：

Ellingsen, Tore ^{[1
]}

Johannesson, Magnus ^{[1
]}

Tjotta, Sigve ^{[2
]}

Torsvik, Gaute ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, Dept Econ, SE-11383 Stockholm, Sweden

[2] Univ Bergen, Dept Econ, N-5007 Bergen, Norway

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2010年 / 68卷 / 01期

关键词：

Guilt aversion; Beliefs; Generosity; Experiments; IMPURE ALTRUISM; TRUST; RECIPROCITY; PROMISES; PROPERTY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.021

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. For example, generosity depends on what the donor believes that the recipient expects to receive. We measure guilt aversion in three separate experiments: a dictator game experiment, a complete information trust game experiment, and a hidden action trust game experiment. In the experiments we inform donors about the beliefs of the matched recipients, while eliciting these beliefs so as to maximize recipient honesty. The correlation between generous behavior and elicited beliefs is close to zero in all three experiments, suggesting that guilt aversion is smaller than previously thought. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：95 / 107

页数：13

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