Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games

被引：3

作者：

Rehbeck, John ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2018年 / 110卷

关键词：

Continuous games; Separable games; Polynomial games; Nash equilibrium; TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS; COLLECTIVE CHOICE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This note studies whether any set of finitely supported mixed strategies can be represented as the unique Nash equilibrium of a game. This note shows that if strategy spaces are metric spaces containing infinitely many points, then any set of finitely supported mixed strategies can be represented as the unique Nash equilibrium to a separable game. If the strategy spaces are additionally subsets of Euclidean space with infinitely many cluster points, then any set of finitely supported mixed strategies can be represented as the unique Nash equilibrium to a polynomial game. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：216 / 225

页数：10

共 10 条

[1] EVERY CHOICE FUNCTION IS BACKWARDS-INDUCTION RATIONALIZABLE [J].