Concept vs. Conception of Justice in Analytic Philosophy of Law (2nd part)

被引：0

作者：

Nestina, Marek ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Komenskeho Bratislave, Evanjelicka Bohoslovecka Fak, Inst Kontextualnej Teol, Bartokova 8, Bratislava 81102, Slovakia

来源：

FILOZOFIA | 2022年 / 77卷 / 05期

关键词：

Concept; Conception; Constitution; Interpretation; Law; Marmor; Polysemy; Pragmatics; Semantics; OPEN TEXTURE;

D O I：

10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.5.3

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

The article is a continuation of the author's contribution Concept vs. Conception of Justice in Analytic Philosophy of Law (Filozofia 2022/4). It focuses on explaining polysemy as a kind of linguistic indeterminacy that constitutes one of the main reasons why courts come to interpret legal texts. The study discusses polysemy from the perspective of the theory of language used by A Marmor in his theory of interpretation. The author shows the limits of semantic analysis in law and the role of normative presuppositions, which influence the final outcome of judicial decision-making not only in terms of content, but are also important for the choice of formal means that are applied in the context of this decision-making.

引用

页码：339 / 356

页数：18