Is it the gums, teeth or the bite? Effectiveness of dimensions of enforcement in curbing corruption

被引:20
作者
Capasso, Salvatore [1 ,2 ]
Goel, Rajeev K. [3 ,4 ]
Saunoris, James W. [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Naples Parthenope, Naples, Italy
[2] Natl Res Council Italy CNR, Inst Studies Mediterranean ISMed, Rome, Italy
[3] Illinois State Univ, Dept Econ, Normal, IL 61790 USA
[4] Kiel Inst World Econ, Kiel, Germany
[5] Eastern Michigan Univ, Dept Econ, Ypsilanti, MI 48197 USA
关键词
Corruption; Enforcement; Conviction rate; Police; Judges; Prosecutors; Institutions; Regulatory quality; Rule of law;
D O I
10.1007/s10101-019-00228-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Adding a somewhat new dimension to the substantial body of research on factors driving cross-national corruption, this paper examines the effectiveness of dimensions of enforcement in reducing corruption. The main novelty lies in comparing the relative influences of latent enforcement (police, judicial, and prosecutorial employment) versus actual enforcement (conviction rates) and enforcing institutions. Results show that piecemeal enforcement efforts to combat corruption by increasing enforcement employment would not be effective, rather comprehensive improvements in institutional quality by strengthening the rule of law or regulatory quality bear greater results. These findings are robust across indices of corruption that capture somewhat different aspects. Thus, in terms of the title of the paper, when it comes to corruption control, strong gums (institutions) are more effective than showing teeth (enforcement employment) or the bite (conviction rates).
引用
收藏
页码:329 / 369
页数:41
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