A Formal Analysis of the Norwegian E-voting Protocol

被引：0

作者：

Cortier, Veronique ^{[1
]}

Wiedling, Cyrille ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CNRS, LORIA, Nancy, France

来源：

PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND TRUST, POST 2012 | 2012年 / 7215卷

关键词：

e-voting; privacy; formal methods; COERCION-RESISTANCE;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP31 [计算机软件];

学科分类号：

081202 ; 0835 ;

摘要：

Norway has used e-voting in its last political election in September 2011, with more than 25 000 voters using the e-voting option. The underlying protocol is a new protocol designed by the ERGO group, involving several actors (a bulletin box but also a receipt generator, a decryption service, and an auditor). Of course, trusting the correctness and security of e-voting protocols is crucial in that context. Formal definitions of properties such as privacy, coercion-resistance or verifiability have been recently proposed, based on equivalence properties. In this paper, we propose a formal analysis of the protocol used in Norway, w.r.t. privacy, considering several corruption scenarios. Part of this study has conducted using the ProVerif tool, on a simplified model.

引用

页码：109 / 128

页数：20