Metaphysics Supervenes on Logic: The Role of the Logical Forms in Hegel's "Replacement" of Metaphysics

In this paper, I seek to explain Hegel's view that his "logic" replaces metaphysics. I argue that Hegel's discussion of logical forms of judgment and syllogism in book III of The Science of Logic is meant to be the foundation of his reformation of metaphysics. Implicit in Hegel's discussion of the logical forms is the view that the metaphysical concepts discussed in books I and II of the Logic supervene on the role of subject and predicate terms in the logical forms discussed in book III. Hegel thus has an explanation for the nature and significance of metaphysical concepts that resembles Kant's "metaphysical deduction." In addition to illustrating the dependence of metaphysics on logic, the present interpretation provides a new picture of the structure of Hegel's Logic that emphasizes the explanatory priority of its Doctrine of the Concept.