Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans

被引:28
作者
Dionne, Georges [1 ]
Rothschild, Casey [2 ]
机构
[1] HEC Montreal, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
[2] Wellesley Coll, Wellesley, MA 02481 USA
关键词
adverse selection; classification risk; classification bans; equity; efficiency; ADVERSE SELECTION; INSURANCE MARKETS; CATEGORICAL DISCRIMINATION; ROTHSCHILD-STIGLITZ; HEALTH-INSURANCE; MORAL HAZARD; ENDOGENOUS CATEGORIZATION; GUARANTEED RENEWABILITY; COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA; GENETIC INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1057/grir.2014.15
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, to compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby to reduce asymmetric information. Permitting risk classification may reduce informational asymmetry-induced adverse selection and improve insurance market efficiency. It may also have undesirable equity consequences and undermine the implicit insurance against reclassification risk, which legislated restrictions on risk classification could provide. We use a canonical insurance market screening model to survey and to extend the risk classification literature. We provide a unified framework for analysing the economic consequences of legalised vs banned risk classification, both in static-information environments and in environments in which additional information can be learned, by either side of the market, through potentially costly tests.
引用
收藏
页码:184 / 221
页数:38
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