Government Debt Management: The Long and the Short of It

被引:20
作者
Faraglia, Elisa [1 ,2 ]
Marcet, Albert [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Oikonomou, Rigas [5 ]
Scott, Andrew [2 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cambridge, Cambridge, England
[2] CEPR, Washington, DC 20009 USA
[3] UCL, London, England
[4] Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain
[5] Catholic Univ Louvain, Louvain La Neuve, Belgium
[6] London Business Sch, London, England
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
Bond repurchases; Computational methods; Debt management; Fiscal policy; Incomplete markets; Maturity structure; Tax smoothing; OPTIMAL MATURITY STRUCTURE;
D O I
10.1093/restud/rdy061
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Standard optimal Debt Management (DM) models prescribe a dominant role for long bonds and advocate against issuing short bonds. They require very large positions in order to complete markets and assume each period that governments repurchase all outstanding bonds and reissue (r/r) new ones. These features of DM are inconsistent with U.S. data. We introduce incomplete markets via small transaction costs which serves to make optimal DM more closely resemble the data : r/r are negligible, short bond issuance substantial and persistent and short and long bonds positively co-vary. Intuitively, long bonds help smooth taxes over states and short bonds over time. Solving incomplete market models with multiple assets is challenging so a further contribution of this article is introducing a novel computational method to find global solutions.
引用
收藏
页码:2554 / 2604
页数:51
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