The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games

被引:26
|
作者
Hwang, Yan-An [2 ]
Liao, Yu-Hsien [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Pingtung Univ Educ, Dept Appl Math, Pingtung 900, Taiwan
[2] Natl Dong Hwa Univ, Dept Appl Math, Hualien 974, Taiwan
关键词
Multi-choice TU games; Replicated TU games; Unit-level-core; Reduced games; COOPERATIVE GAMES; CONSISTENCY; PAYMENTS;
D O I
10.1007/s10898-009-9463-6
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This note extends the solution concept of the core for traditional transferable-utility (TU) games to multi-choice TU games, which we name the unit-level-core. It turns out that the unit-level-core of a multi-choice TU game is a "replicated subset" of the core of a corresponding "replicated" TU game. We propose an extension of the theorem of Bondareva (Probl Kybern 10:119-139, 1963) and Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 14:453-460, 1967) to multi-choice games. Also, we introduce the reduced games for multi-choice TU games and provide an axiomatization of the unit-level-core on multi-choice TU games by means of consistency and its converse.
引用
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页码:161 / 171
页数:11
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