Multi-choice TU games;
Replicated TU games;
Unit-level-core;
Reduced games;
COOPERATIVE GAMES;
CONSISTENCY;
PAYMENTS;
D O I:
10.1007/s10898-009-9463-6
中图分类号:
C93 [管理学];
O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号:
070105 ;
12 ;
1201 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
This note extends the solution concept of the core for traditional transferable-utility (TU) games to multi-choice TU games, which we name the unit-level-core. It turns out that the unit-level-core of a multi-choice TU game is a "replicated subset" of the core of a corresponding "replicated" TU game. We propose an extension of the theorem of Bondareva (Probl Kybern 10:119-139, 1963) and Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 14:453-460, 1967) to multi-choice games. Also, we introduce the reduced games for multi-choice TU games and provide an axiomatization of the unit-level-core on multi-choice TU games by means of consistency and its converse.
机构:
Waseda Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Shinjuku Ku, 1-6-1 Nishi Waseda, Tokyo 1698050, JapanWaseda Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Shinjuku Ku, 1-6-1 Nishi Waseda, Tokyo 1698050, Japan
机构:
Univ Lyon, CNRS, UJM St Etienne, GATE L SE UMR 5824, F-42023 St Etienne, FranceUniv Lyon, CNRS, UJM St Etienne, GATE L SE UMR 5824, F-42023 St Etienne, France
Gonzalez, Stephane
Lardon, Aymeric
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机构:
Univ Lyon, CNRS, UJM St Etienne, GATE L SE UMR 5824, F-42023 St Etienne, FranceUniv Lyon, CNRS, UJM St Etienne, GATE L SE UMR 5824, F-42023 St Etienne, France