Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers

被引：75

作者：

Maskin, ES ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Littauer Ctr, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2000年 / 44卷 / 4-6期

关键词：

efficient auctions; liquidity constraints;

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00057-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We exhibit an efficient auction - an auction for which the winner is the buyer with the highest valuation - subject to the constraint that buyers may be budget- or liquidity-constrained. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; D82.

引用

页码：667 / 681

页数：15

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