Savage's theorem under changing awareness

被引:12
作者
Dietrich, Franz [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Paris Sch Econ, Paris, France
[2] CNRS, Paris, France
[3] MSE, 106-112 Blvd Hop, F-75013 Paris, France
关键词
Decision under uncertainty; Outcome unawareness versus state unawareness; Non-fine versus non-exhaustive awareness; Utility revision versus probability revision; Small worlds versus grand worlds; INTERACTIVE UNAWARENESS; SUBJECTIVE-PROBABILITY; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.015
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper proposes a simple unified framework of choice under changing awareness, addressing both outcome awareness and (nature) state awareness, and both how fine and how exhaustive the awareness is. Six axioms characterize an (essentially unique) expected-utility rationalization of preferences, in which utilities and probabilities are revised according to three revision rules when awareness changes: (R1) utilities of unaffected outcomes are transformed affinely; (R2) probabilities of unaffected events are transformed proportionally; (R3) enough probabilities 'objectively' never change (they represent revealed objective risk). Savage's Theorem is a special case of the theorem, namely the special case of fixed awareness, in which our axioms reduce to Savage's axioms while R1 and R2 hold trivially and R3 reduces to Savage's requirement of atomless probabilities. Rule R2 parallels Karni and Viero's (2013) 'reverse Bayesianism' and Ahn and Ergin's (2010) 'partition-dependence'. The theorem draws mathematically on Kopylov (2007), Niiniluoto (1972) and Wakker (1981). (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 54
页数:54
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