In the Opponent's Shoes: Increasing the Behavioral Validity of Attackers' Judgments in Counterterrorism Models

被引:12
作者
Bhashyam, Sumitra Sri [1 ]
Montibeller, Gilberto [2 ]
机构
[1] Evidera, Metro Bldg,6th Floor,1 Butterwick, London W6 8DL, England
[2] Univ Loughborough, Sch Business & Econ, Loughborough LE11 3TU, Leics, England
关键词
Behavioral validity; counterterrorism risk analysis; terrorist decision making; terrorist judgments; DECISION-MAKING; RISK ANALYSIS; ECONOMIC-THEORY; SEXUAL AROUSAL; TERRORISM RISK; CHOICE; MANAGEMENT; FEELINGS; CRITIQUE; THREATS;
D O I
10.1111/risa.12422
中图分类号
R1 [预防医学、卫生学];
学科分类号
1004 ; 120402 ;
摘要
A key objective for policymakers and analysts dealing with terrorist threats is trying to predict the actions that malicious agents may take. A recent trend in counterterrorism risk analysis is to model the terrorists' judgments, as these will guide their choices of such actions. The standard assumptions in most of these models are that terrorists are fully rational, following all the normative desiderata required for rational choices, such as having a set of constant and ordered preferences, being able to perform a cost-benefit analysis of their alternatives, among many others. However, are such assumptions reasonable from a behavioral perspective? In this article, we analyze the types of assumptions made across various counterterrorism analytical models that represent malicious agents' judgments and discuss their suitability from a descriptive point of view. We then suggest how some of these assumptions could be modified to describe terrorists' preferences more accurately, by drawing knowledge from the fields of behavioral decision research, politics, philosophy of choice, public choice, and conflict management in terrorism. Such insight, we hope, might help make the assumptions of these models more behaviorally valid for counterterrorism risk analysis.
引用
收藏
页码:666 / 680
页数:15
相关论文
共 92 条
[21]   Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model [J].
Caplan, Bryan .
PUBLIC CHOICE, 2006, 128 (1-2) :91-107
[22]  
Cordes Bonnie., 1984, TRENDS INT TERRORISM
[24]   Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk [J].
Ezell, Barry Charles ;
Bennett, Steven P. ;
von Winterfeldt, Detlof ;
Sokolowski, John ;
Collins, Andrew J. .
RISK ANALYSIS, 2010, 30 (04) :575-589
[25]   CHANGING TASTES AND COHERENT DYNAMIC CHOICE [J].
HAMMOND, PJ .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1976, 43 (01) :159-173
[26]   Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, I-III part I. the basic model [J].
Harsanyi, John C. ;
Myerson, Roger B. .
Management Science, 2004, 50 (12 SUPPL.) :1804-1824
[27]   Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game [J].
Hausken, Kjell ;
Zhuang, Jun .
DECISION ANALYSIS, 2011, 8 (01) :46-70
[28]  
Hinshelwood R.D., 1995, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, VS 95, P185
[29]   Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack [J].
Hoffman, Bruce ;
McCormick, Gordon H. .
STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM, 2004, 27 (04) :243-281
[30]   THE EFFECT OF POSITIVE FEELINGS ON RISK-TAKING - WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN [J].
ISEN, AM ;
PATRICK, R .
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE, 1983, 31 (02) :194-202