Competition, securitization, and efficiency in US banks*

被引:11
作者
Bayeh, Antonio [1 ]
Bitar, Mohammad [2 ]
Burlacu, Radu [3 ]
Walker, Thomas [4 ]
机构
[1] Lyon Catholic Univ, ESDES Business Sch, 10 Pl Arch, F-69288 Lyon 02, France
[2] Univ Nottingham, Business Sch, Wollaton Rd, Nottingham NG8 1BB, England
[3] Univ Grenoble Alpes, CERAG, 150 Rue Chim, F-38040 Grenoble 09, France
[4] Concordia Univ, John Molson Sch Business, Dept Finance, 1455 Blvd Maisonneuve West, Montreal, PQ, Canada
关键词
Securitization; Competition; Bank efficiency; Screening and monitoring; Bank regulation; MARKET POWER; PANEL-DATA; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; PROPENSITY SCORE; X-INEFFICIENCY; COST; MANAGEMENT; DEREGULATION; SENSITIVITY; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.qref.2021.04.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the different effects of competition and securitization on US bank efficiency between 2001 and 2019. Using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and a two-step dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, we find that higher securitization increases banks' cost efficiency scores. When banks are under competitive pressure, the fixed-effects and GMM models show that securitization is positively associated with the cost efficiency of banks, while it mitigates their screening and monitoring incentives. Robust to a battery of alternative tests, our findings introduce bank efficiency as a new mechanism explaining how banks that securitize loans insignificantly invest in screening and monitoring their potentially risky borrowers. In order to promote sustainable loan quality, this paper underlines the importance of improved regulation in highly competitive markets where loan securitization is more common. (c) 2021 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:553 / 576
页数:24
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