Blockchain technology for port logistics capability: Exclusive or sharing

被引:80
作者
Wang, Junjin [1 ]
Liu, Jiaguo [1 ]
Wang, Fan [2 ]
Yue, Xiaohang [3 ]
机构
[1] Dalian Maritime Univ, Sch Maritime Econ & Management, Dalian 116026, Peoples R China
[2] Sun Yat Sen Univ, Sun Yat sen Business Sch, Guangzhou 510275, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Wisconsin, Lubar Sch Business, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Port logistics capability; Port competition; Blockchain technology; Horizontal collaboration; TRANSPORTATION SERVICE PROCUREMENT; GAME-THEORETICAL APPROACH; INCENTIVE ANALYSIS; COMPETITION; CONGESTION; INVESTMENTS; COOPERATION; HINTERLAND; COMPANY; NETWORK;
D O I
10.1016/j.trb.2021.05.010
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Although the application of blockchain technology in maritime industry can improve the customs clearance efficiency and logistics transparency in the container cargo supply chains, it generates the unit operations cost and setup cost. In this study, a spatial model is proposed to conduct an investigation into the two heterogeneous ports when blockchain technology is applied under inter-port competition. Different utility-driven operations models are built to highlight the values of blockchain technology for port logistics capability, and to reveal the equilibria under the optimal strategies and equilibrium strategies. It is noticed that the relationship between the unit net benefit and unit operations cost brought out by blockchain technology is a key factor determining whether the blockchain technology is applicable. When the unit operations cost is lower than unit net benefit, and the setup cost is high, there is a win-win situation for two ports to apply traditional technology. It is further verified to be Pareto-optimal. In addition, three lose-lose situations are also identified, which are classic Prisoner's Dilemmas. Consequently, a horizontal collaboration mechanism "blockchain technology sharing + compensation"(BTSC) is designed to not only break these three Prisoner's Dilemmas, but also achieve the Paretooptimum. Furthermore, we discuss some extensions to prove the robustness of our main qualitative insights. (C) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:347 / 392
页数:46
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