Product homogeneity as a prisoner's dilemma in a duopoly with R&D

被引:26
作者
Lambertini, L [1 ]
Rossini, G [1 ]
机构
[1] Dipartimento Sci Econ, I-40125 Bologna, Italy
关键词
R & D; product innovation; externality;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00011-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We prove that firms may decide to compete in undifferentiated products due to a prisoner's dilemma generated by externalities affecting R&D in product innovation. Moreover, the incentive to invest is higher under price competition than under quantity competition. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.
引用
收藏
页码:297 / 301
页数:5
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