Impacts of Tradable Emission Permits on Oligopoly Electricity Market Production under Complete and Incomplete Information

被引:0
作者
Gao, Hui [1 ]
Wen, Fushuan [2 ]
MacGill, Iain [2 ]
机构
[1] S China Univ Technol, Dept Elect Engn, Guangzhou 510640, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] Univ New S Wales, Ctr Energy & Environm Markets CEEM, Sch Elect Engn & Telecommun, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
来源
2009 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEMS, MAN AND CYBERNETICS (SMC 2009), VOLS 1-9 | 2009年
关键词
Electricity market; emissions trading; Cournot game theory; oligopoly; non-cooperative games; RIGHTS; POWER;
D O I
10.1109/ICSMC.2009.5346193
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
A method is developed to explore the potential links between an oligopolistic electricity market and a competitive emission permit market in which permits allocated to those highly efficient generation companies (units) with lower emissions could be traded to other companies with higher emissions. The well-developed Cournot non-cooperative game model is employed to describe the behavior of power producers, and to determine the market equilibriums of generation outputs under complete and incomplete information. A numerical example with six power producers is employed to demonstrate the features of the developed model as well as to analyze the impacts of emission permit trading on the oligopoly electric market equilibriums.
引用
收藏
页码:3365 / +
页数:3
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