Unemployment insurance and management of the older workforce in a dual labor market: Evidence from France

被引:14
作者
Baguelin, Olivier [1 ]
Remillon, Delphine [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] UEVE EPEE TEPP FR CNRS 3126, Blvd F Mitterrand, F-91025 Evry, France
[2] INED, F-75980 Paris 20, France
[3] CEE, F-93166 Noisy Le Grand, France
关键词
Unemployment insurance; Unemployment inflow; Benefit duration; Older workers; Early retirement; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; EXTENDED BENEFITS; MORAL HAZARD; DURATION; RETIREMENT; EMPLOYMENT; RATES;
D O I
10.1016/j.labeco.2014.04.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a context of population aging, reducing early exit from the labor force is a major challenge. In this domain, the role of unemployment insurance (UI) is probably underestimated and its statistical assessment remains insufficient. And yet, when considering a possible separation, it is likely that workers who are close to retirement, and thus their employers if they wish to reduce their workforce, care about UI. In particular, they are likely to care about whether or not, potential benefit duration is long enough to cover the time until retirement. This paper provides evidence in support of this hypothesis for some worker profiles. The analysis is conducted using data from the French employment agency over the period 2001 to 2005. It is based on a natural experiment: on January 1, 2003, the potential benefit duration of UI entrants was sharply reduced. Econometric analysis of the age patterns of UI inflow reveals that the age incentives provided by UI rules greatly influence labor market behaviors: dismissals of insiders close to retirement are often scheduled so that they can receive benefits until retirement. We estimate that the reform increased the mean age at job termination of workers dismissed close to retirement by 4 months. Our findings confirm that UI rules have an impact on inflow into unemployment and that UI is viewed by some employers and/or some workers as an early retirement scheme rather than as insurance against the risk of job loss. Thus, addressing the issue of older workers' participation in the labor market requires consideration of the joint impact of UI and retirement system rules. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:245 / 264
页数:20
相关论文
共 37 条
[1]   Unemployment insurance takeup rates and the after-tax value of benefits [J].
Anderson, PM ;
Meyer, BD .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1997, 112 (03) :913-937
[2]  
Barbanchon Thomas Le, 2012, 201221 CREST
[3]  
Behaghel L, 2011, NBER WORKING PAPER S, V17055
[4]   The perverse effects of partial employment protection reform:: The case of French older workers [J].
Behaghel, Luc ;
Creon, Bruno ;
Sedillot, Beatrice .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2008, 92 (3-4) :696-721
[5]   Does the recent success of some OECD countries in lowering their unemployment rates lie in the clever design of their labor market reforms? [J].
Belot, M ;
van Ours, JC .
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 2004, 56 (04) :621-642
[6]  
Ben Salem Melika, 2010, Social security programs and retirement around the world: The relationship to youth employment, P119, DOI DOI 10.7208/CHICAGO/9780226309507.003.0005
[7]  
Blasco S., 2008, DOCUMENTS TRAVAIL CR
[8]  
BOZIO A, 2008, PENS INT J, V13, P207
[9]   Extended benefits and the duration of UI spells: evidence from the New Jersey extended benefit program [J].
Card, D ;
Levine, PB .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2000, 78 (1-2) :107-138
[10]   Moral hazard versus liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance [J].
Chetty, Raj .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2008, 116 (02) :173-234