How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive pay in China's listed firms

被引:222
|
作者
Firth, Michael [1 ]
Fung, Peter M. Y.
Rui, Oliver M.
机构
[1] Lingnan Univ, Dept Finance & Insurance, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Hong Kong Commun Coll, Div Business, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Accountancy, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
ownership; board structure; executive compensation;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.01.014
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article contributes to the international corporate governance literature by examining factors that affect CEO compensation in China. The article develops models of CEO pay based on an understanding of the unique economic and structural reforms undertaken by the privatized State Owned Enterprises. The findings show that CEO compensation depends, in part, on the firm's operating profits and this indicates that incentive systems are being used to motivate top managers. Corporate governance factors have a significant impact on CEO compensation, but they do so in ways that differ from those in other countries. The conclusions are robust across different formulations of the basic model and they have public policy implications for China and other transitional economies that are moving away from state ownership of business enterprises. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:776 / 785
页数:10
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