On Phenomenal Consciousness in the Third Person

Marek Havlik fails in his attempt to make out the claim, on the basis of certain neurobiological data, that the "hard problem of consciousness" (in Chalmers, Block and others) is only a pseudo-problem (Jake je to byt hyperempatikem? Prispevek empiricke ke vedy k subjektivni zkugenosti - What Is It Like to Be a Hyper-empathic? Filosoficky casopis, 63, 2015, No. 4, pp. 501-518). Havlik's presentation of the arguments in the authors whom he criticises is incomplete and his own attempt to justify an extremely reductionistic standpoint does not take into account the actual state of the question and itself introduces no new conception. The series of neuropathological situations which are presented by the author in support of the justification of the non-existence of phenomenal consciousness is proof only of a more or less narrow correlation between the subjective experiences of those suffering from neurologic illness and the state of their brains, and it has nothing to say about the existence or non-existence of an aspect accessible only from the "first-person point of view", for phenomenal consciousness is present even in these patients. In this article it is also indicated that the theme of the "hard problem of consciousness" was implicitly and richly displayed in phenomenological philosophy, and that this should be the standard for discussions of the issue.