On the complexity of coordination

被引:9
作者
Gossner, O
Hernández, P
机构
[1] Univ Paris 10, CNRS, UMR 7536, THEMA, F-92001 Nanterre, France
[2] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, Louvain, Belgium
关键词
REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA; REPEATED GAMES; FINITE AUTOMATA; ENTROPY;
D O I
10.1287/moor.28.1.127.14257
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Many results on repeated games played by finite automata rely on the complexity of the exact implementation of a coordinated play of length n. For a large proportion of sequences, this complexity appears to be no less than n. We study the complexity of a coordinated play when allowing for a few mismatches. We prove the existence of a constant C such that if (m ln m)/n greater than or equal to C, for almost any sequence of length n, there exists an automaton of size m that achieves a coordination ratio close to 1 with it. Moreover, we show that one can take any constant C such that C > e \X\ ln \X\, where \X\ is the size of the alphabet from which the sequence is drawn. Our result contrasts with Neyman (1997) that shows that when (m ln m)/n is close to 0, for almost no sequence of length n there exists an automaton of size m that achieves a coordination ratio significantly larger 1/\X\ with it.
引用
收藏
页码:127 / 140
页数:14
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