Knowledge, hope, and fallibilism

被引:10
作者
Benton, Matthew A. [1 ]
机构
[1] Seattle Pacific Univ, 3307 3rd Ave W,Ste 109, Seattle, WA 98119 USA
关键词
Knowledge; Hope; Fallibilism; Infallibilism; Epistemic modals; Factives; EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY; ASSERTION; ACCOUNT; NORM;
D O I
10.1007/s11229-018-1794-8
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p" is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not sign p On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not sign p But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription with outright assertions, with first- and third-person knowledge ascriptions, and with factive predicates suggest a problem: when combined with a plausible principle on the rationality of hope, they suggest that fallibilism is false. By contrast, the infallibilist about knowledge can straightforwardly explain why knowledge would be incompatible with hope, and can offer a simple and unified explanation of all the linguistic data introduced here. This suggests that fallibilists bear an explanatory burden which has been hitherto overlooked.
引用
收藏
页码:1673 / 1689
页数:17
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