UEFA Champions League Entry Has Not Satisfied Strategyproofness in Three Seasons

被引:28
作者
Csato, Laszlo [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Hungarian Acad Sci MTA SZTAKI, Inst Comp Sci & Control, Res Grp Operat Res & Decis Syst, Lab Engn & Management Intelligence, Budapest, Hungary
[2] Corvinus Univ Budapest BCE, Dept Operat Res & Actuarial Sci, Budapest, Hungary
关键词
OR in Sports; tournament ranking; UEFA champions league; strategyproofness; manipulation;
D O I
10.1177/1527002519833091
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article investigates the qualification for the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) Champions League (CL), the most prestigious club competition in European football, with respect to the theoretical property of strategyproofness. We find that in three seasons (2015-2016, 2016-2017, and 2017-2018), the UEFA Europa League titleholder might have been better off by losing its match against the CL titleholder in their domestic championship. A straightforward solution is suggested in order to avoid the occurrence of this paradox. The use of an incentive compatible rule would have a real effect on the qualification in these three seasons of the UEFA CL.
引用
收藏
页码:975 / 981
页数:7
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