Markets for Information: An Introduction

被引:94
作者
Bergemann, Dirk [1 ]
Bonatti, Alessandro [2 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06511 USA
[2] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
来源
ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 11, 2019 | 2019年 / 11卷
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
information markets; information design; intermediaries; mechanism design; predictions; ratings; PRICE; COURNOT; DESIGN; DUOPOLY; PRIVACY;
D O I
10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015439
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We survey a recent and growing literature on markets for information. We offer a comprehensive view of information markets through an integrated model of consumers, information intermediaries, and firms. The model embeds a large set of applications ranging from sponsored-search advertising to credit scores to information sharing among competitors. We then zoom in to one of the critical elements in the markets for information: the design of the information. We distinguish between ex ante sales of information (the buyer acquires an information structure) and ex post sales (the buyer pays for specific realizations). We relate this distinction to the different products that brokers, advertisers, and publishers use to trade consumer information online. We discuss the endogenous limits to the trade of information that derive from the potential adverse use of information to the consumers. Finally, we discuss recommender systems and other information filtering systems that use artificial intelligence to predict ratings or preferences in markets for indirect information.
引用
收藏
页码:85 / 107
页数:23
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