Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models

被引:9
作者
Levine, David K. [1 ,2 ]
Modica, Salvatore [3 ]
机构
[1] Washington Univ, Dept Econ, St Louis, MO 63130 USA
[2] European Univ Inst, Florence, Italy
[3] Univ Palermo Salvatore, Dept Econ, Palermo, Italy
关键词
Evolution; conventions; Markov chains; state power; EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION;
D O I
10.3982/TE1978
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict, and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing dynasty and the rise of communism in China.
引用
收藏
页码:89 / 131
页数:43
相关论文
共 18 条
[1]   A theory of political transitions [J].
Acemoglu, D ;
Robinson, JA .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 91 (04) :938-963
[2]  
Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), 2002, 1793 AAIB
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2013, 19221 NBER
[4]   Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection [J].
Binmore, K ;
Samuelson, L .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 74 (02) :235-265
[5]  
Blume LE, 2003, GAME ECON BEHAV, V44, P251, DOI [10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00554-7, 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00554-7]
[6]   Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition [J].
Cui, Zhiwei ;
Zhai, Jian .
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2010, 46 (06) :1015-1029
[7]   LEARNING, LOCAL INTERACTION, AND COORDINATION [J].
ELLISON, G .
ECONOMETRICA, 1993, 61 (05) :1047-1071
[8]   Basins of attraction, long-run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step evolution [J].
Ellison, G .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2000, 67 (01) :17-45
[9]  
Ellison G., 2014, FAST CONVERGEN UNPUB
[10]  
Fenby Jonathan., 2008, MODERN CHINA FALL RI