Risk-Based Mitigation of Load Curtailment Cyber Attack Using Intelligent Agents in a Shipboard Power System

被引:39
作者
Kushal, Tazim Ridwan Billah [1 ]
Lai, Kexing [1 ]
Illindala, Mahesh S. [1 ]
机构
[1] Ohio State Univ, Elect & Comp Engn Dept, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
Cyber security; energy storage; intelligent agents; microgrids; multi-agent systems; optimization; risk analysis; shipboard power system; DATA INJECTION ATTACKS; SECURITY; MICROGRIDS; MANAGEMENT; SCHEMES;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2018.2867809
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Modern shipboard power systems (SPSs) with advanced cyber infrastructure need urgent attention because they have higher risk of cyber attacks. In particular, false data injection (FDI) attacks can interfere with state estimation by tampering with measurement devices, or they may also directly target the central control system. This paper proposes a twofold strategy to mitigate the effects of such an unconventional FDI attack, using battery to actively reduce load curtailment. To detect signs of malicious data, a multiagent system (MAS) that checks commands from the central energy management system is employed. A novel bilevel optimization problem is formulated to model the interaction between the battery and the compromised SPS. A heuristic defense parameter is developed to improve the detection of corrupted commands. The merits of the proposed scheme are evaluated using a risk analysis model. The results of the case studies prove that a combination of autonomous battery with MAS-based heuristic method is effective in mitigating the effects of the cyber attack.
引用
收藏
页码:4741 / 4750
页数:10
相关论文
共 38 条
[1]  
Ahmad M, 2013, POWER SYSTEM STATE ESTIMATION, P1
[2]  
[Anonymous], 2013, COMPLEMENTARITY MODE
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2010, 2010 ECRIME RES SUMM, DOI DOI 10.1109/ECRIME.2010.5706699
[4]   Bilevel programming applied to power system vulnerability analysis under multiple contingencies [J].
Arroyo, J. M. .
IET GENERATION TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION, 2010, 4 (02) :178-190
[5]  
Babineau GL, 2012, 2012 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TECHNOLOGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, P99, DOI 10.1109/THS.2012.6459832
[6]   Detection of False-Data Injection Attacks in Cyber-Physical DC Microgrids [J].
Beg, Omar Ali ;
Johnson, Taylor T. ;
Davoudi, Ali .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, 2017, 13 (05) :2693-2703
[7]   DC Microgrids: Economic Operation and Enhancement of Resilience by Hierarchical Control [J].
Che, Liang ;
Shahidehpour, Mohammad .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, 2014, 5 (05) :2517-2526
[8]   Distributed Finite-Time Economic Dispatch of a Network of Energy Resources [J].
Chen, Gang ;
Ren, Jianghong ;
Feng, E. Ning .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, 2017, 8 (02) :822-832
[9]  
Chlela M., 2016, P WORKSHOP COMMUNICA, P1
[10]  
DiRenzo J., 2015, P 6 INT C INF INT SY, P1, DOI DOI 10.1109/IISA.2015.7388071