Improving efficiency of on-campus housing:: An experimental study

[1] The moonlighting game - An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2000, 42 (02) : 265 - 277

[2] Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1998, 66 (03) : 689 - 701

[3] House allocation with existing tenants [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1999, 88 (02) : 233 - 260

[4] [Anonymous], 1994, EC THEORY

[5] CHEN Y, 1999, EXPT STUDY HOUSE ALL

[6] CHEN Y, 2002, IN PRESS HDB EXPT EC

[7] THE STRATEGY STRUCTURE OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (04) : 873 - 888

[8] COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE [J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) : 9 - &

[9] ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY OF MARKETS WITH ZERO-INTELLIGENCE TRADERS - MARKET AS A PARTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1993, 101 (01) : 119 - 137

[10] Harrison G. W., 1996, RES EXPT EC, V6, P53

[1] The moonlighting game - An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2000, 42 (02) : 265 - 277

[2] Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1998, 66 (03) : 689 - 701

[3] House allocation with existing tenants [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1999, 88 (02) : 233 - 260

[4] [Anonymous], 1994, EC THEORY

[5] CHEN Y, 1999, EXPT STUDY HOUSE ALL

[6] CHEN Y, 2002, IN PRESS HDB EXPT EC

[7] THE STRATEGY STRUCTURE OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (04) : 873 - 888

[8] COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE [J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) : 9 - &

[9] ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY OF MARKETS WITH ZERO-INTELLIGENCE TRADERS - MARKET AS A PARTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1993, 101 (01) : 119 - 137

[10] Harrison G. W., 1996, RES EXPT EC, V6, P53