An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems

被引：3
|
作者：
Xu, Yongsheng [1 ]
Yoshihara, Naoki [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Georgia State Univ, Dept Econ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Atlanta, GA 30302 USA
[2] Univ Massachusetts Amherst, Dept Econ, Amherst, MA 01002 USA
[3] Hitotsubashi Univ, Inst Econ Res, Kunitachi, Tokyo 1868603, Japan
[4] Kochi Univ Technol, Sch Management, Kochi 7828502, Japan
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2019年 / 48卷 / 03期
关键词：
Non-convex bargaining problem; Nash solution; Equitable Nash solution; Equity principle; Binary weak axiom of revealed preference; RATIONALITY; EXTENSION;
D O I：
10.1007/s00182-019-00658-4
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper studies the Nash solution to non-convex bargaining problems. Given the multiplicity of the Nash solution in this context, we refine the Nash solution by incorporating an equity consideration. The proposed refinement is defined as the composition of the Nash solution and a variant of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. We then present an axiomatic characterization of the new solution.
引用
收藏
页码：769 / 779
页数：11
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