"Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall - Who Is the Greatest Investor of all?" Effects of Better-than-Average Beliefs on Venture Funding

被引:8
作者
Linder, Christian [1 ]
Sperber, Sonja [2 ]
机构
[1] ESCP Europe Business Sch, Management Dept, London Campus,527 Finchley Rd, London NW3 7BG, England
[2] ISM Int Sch Management, Management Dept, Frankfurt Campus,Morfelder Landstr 55, D-60598 Frankfurt, Germany
关键词
principal-agent theory; better-than-average; interpersonal similarities; uncertainty tolerance; competitive behaviour; new venture funding; FINANCIAL DECISION-MAKING; AGENCY THEORY; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; CEO OVERCONFIDENCE; STEWARDSHIP THEORY; RISK PERCEPTION; PROSPECT-THEORY; ABOVE-AVERAGE; SELF; UNCERTAINTY;
D O I
10.1111/emre.12363
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Agency theory considers information the most decisive element in investor-entrepreneur relations. Building on the notion of better-than-average (BTA) beliefs, we investigate the extent to which information asymmetries between investors and entrepreneurs may also emerge on paths other than the self-interest or opportunistic behaviour of rational actors. Based on a data set of 176 investors from 23 different German financial institutions, we conduct a conditional process analysis that indicates approximately 30% of all professional investors hold unjustified BTA beliefs regarding their abilities to identify flaws in new venture ideas, which leads to inaccurate financing decisions. We further find evidence that investors generally tend to underfund start-up projects if they perceive little similarity with the founders, but overfund projects if interpersonal similarities are high. Moreover, we demonstrate that high BTA beliefs facilitate engagement in competition with peers for the best investment option.
引用
收藏
页码:407 / 426
页数:20
相关论文
共 136 条
[1]   Corporate financing decisions under ambiguity: Pecking order and liquidity policy implications [J].
Agliardi, Elettra ;
Agliardi, Rossella ;
Spanjers, Willem .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH, 2016, 69 (12) :6012-6020
[2]   MARKET FOR LEMONS - QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND MARKET MECHANISM [J].
AKERLOF, GA .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1970, 84 (03) :488-500
[3]  
Alicke M. D., 2005, SELF SOCIAL JUDGMENT, P85, DOI DOI 10.4324/9780203943250-11
[4]   PERSONAL CONTACT, INDIVIDUATION, AND THE BETTER-THAN-AVERAGE EFFECT [J].
ALICKE, MD ;
KLOTZ, ML ;
BREITENBECHER, DL ;
YURAK, TJ ;
VREDENBURG, DS .
JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1995, 68 (05) :804-825
[5]  
AMIT R, 1990, MANAGE SCI, V36, P1232, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.36.10.1233
[6]  
[Anonymous], 1998, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, V8, P173, DOI [10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024377, DOI 10.1093/OXFORDJOURNALS.JPART.A024377]
[7]  
[Anonymous], 2001, VENTURE CAPITAL INT
[8]   Rationality and its symbols:: Signalling effects and subjectification in management consulting [J].
Armbrüster, T .
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, 2004, 41 (08) :1247-1269
[9]  
Aronson E., 1980, SOCIAL ANIMAL
[10]  
Arrow K J., 1985, The economics of agency