The co-evolution of networks and prisoner's dilemma game by considering sensitivity and visibility

被引:23
作者
Li, Dandan [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Ma, Jing [1 ]
Han, Dun [4 ]
Sun, Mei [4 ]
Tian, Lixin [5 ]
Stanley, H. Eugene [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ Aeronaut & Astronaut, Coll Econ & Management, Nanjing 211106, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Boston Univ, Ctr Polymer Studies, Boston, MA 02215 USA
[3] Boston Univ, Dept Phys, Boston, MA 02215 USA
[4] Jiangsu Univ, Nonlinear Sci Res Ctr, Zhenjiang 212013, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[5] Nanjing Normal Univ, Sch Math Sci, Nanjing 210042, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
来源
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2017年 / 7卷
关键词
PROMOTES COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; INEQUALITY; BEHAVIOR; WEALTH;
D O I
10.1038/srep45237
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Strategies adopted by individuals in a social network significantly impact the network, and they strongly affect relationships between individuals in the network. Links between individuals also heavily influence their levels of cooperation. Taking into account the evolution of each individual's connection, we explore how sensitivity and visibility affect the prisoner's dilemma game. The so-called 'sensitivity' and 'visibility' respectively present one's self-protection consciousness and the ability of gaining information. We find that at moderate levels of player sensitivity cooperative behavior increases, but that at high levels it is inhibited. We also find that the heterogeneity of the weight of individuals at the end of the game is higher when sensitivity and visibility are increased, but that the successful-defection-payoff has less impact on the weight of individuals and on the relationship between the heterogeneity of the weight of individuals and the density of cooperators. This framework can be used to clarify the interaction mechanism between the micro-level of individual behavior and the macro-level of individual co-evolutionary processes.
引用
收藏
页数:9
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