Estimating Central Banks' preferences from a time-varying empirical reaction function

被引:54
作者
Assenmacher-Wesche, Katrin [1 ]
机构
[1] Swiss Natl Bank Res, CH-8022 Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
central bank reaction function; Taylor rule; Markov switching;
D O I
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.10.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We estimate monetary policy reaction functions for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, using a Markov-switching model that allows for shifts in the coefficients of the central bank's reaction function as well as for independent shifts in the residual variance. The results indicate that central bank policy can be characterized as falling into a low- and a high-inflation regime. Over time all central banks have assigned changing weights to inflation and the output gap. Switching in the residual variance turns out to be important for the fit of the model. As a reaction function is a reduced form, coefficients embody preference parameters as well as parameters characterizing the structure of the economy. To recover the central banks' preferences, we estimate the preference parameters jointly with a small model of the economy. The results show that the Bundesbank has placed a relatively higher weight on inflation than the Fed. Moreover, for the Bundesbank and the Fed the differences between both regimes seem to originate mainly from a changing preference for interest rate smoothing. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1951 / 1974
页数:24
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