Reductionism and antireductionism: Rights and wrongs

被引:0
作者
Jones, T [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Nevada, Dept Philosophy, Las Vegas, NV 89154 USA
关键词
reduction; reductionism; physics; mental states; causal closure; subsumption;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Scholars are divided as to whether reduction should be a central strategy for understanding the world. While reductive analysis is the standard mode of explanation in many areas of science and everyday life, many scholars consider reductionism a sign of 'intellectual naivete and backwardness'. This article makes three points about the proper status of antireductionism. First, reduction is, in fact, a centrally important epistemic strategy. Second, reduction to physics is always possible for all causal properties. Third, there are, nevertheless, reasons why we want science to discover properties and explanations other than reductive physical ones.
引用
收藏
页码:615 / 647
页数:33
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