INFORMATION PERCOLATION WITH EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH DYNAMICS

被引:74
作者
Duffie, Darrell [1 ,2 ]
Malamud, Semyon [3 ,4 ]
Manso, Gustavo [5 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Ecole Polytech Fed Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
[4] Swiss Finance Inst, Zurich, Switzerland
[5] MIT, Sloan Sch Business, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
关键词
Information percolation; search; learning; equilibrium; MARKETS; LIQUIDITY; MODEL;
D O I
10.3982/ECTA8160
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of Information sharing in a large population Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern Individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional information. When two agents meet, they share their information The Information gathered is further shared at subsequent meetings, and so on. Equilibria exist in which agents search maximally until they acquire sufficient information precision and then search minimally A tax whose proceeds are used to Subsidize the costs of search improves information sharing and can, in some cases, increase welfare on the other hand, endowing agents with public signals reduces Information sharing and can, in some cases, decrease welfare
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页码:1513 / 1574
页数:62
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