The promise and pitfalls of using imprecise school accountability measures

被引:195
作者
Kane, TJ [1 ]
Staiger, DO
机构
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA
[2] Dartmouth Coll, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/089533002320950993
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In recent years, most states have constructed elaborate accountability systems using school-level test scores. However, because the median elementary school contains only 69 children per grade level, such measures are quite imprecise. We evaluate the implications for school accountability systems. For instance, rewards or sanctions for schools with scores at either extreme primarily affect small schools and provide weak incentives to large ones. Nevertheless, we conclude that accountability systems may be worthwhile. Even in states with aggressive financial incentives, the marginal reward to schools for raising student performance is a small fraction of the potential labor market value for students.
引用
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页码:91 / 114
页数:24
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