Do Politicians' Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence from Municipal Elections

被引：43

作者：

Fafchamps, Marcel ^{[1
]}

Labonne, Julien ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[2] Univ Oxford, Oxford, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION | 2017年 / 33卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN; POLITICALLY CONNECTED FIRMS; NETWORKS; RETURNS; MARKET;

D O I：

10.1093/jleo/ewx001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper estimates the impacts of being connected to politicians on occupational choice. Using an administrative dataset collected in 2008-2010 on 20 million individuals in the Philippines, we rely on naming conventions to assess family links to candidates in elections held in 2007 and 2010. We combine a regression discontinuity design to close elections in 2007 with an alternative approach using individuals connected to successful candidates in 2010 as control group. This allows us to net out the possible cost associated with being related to a losing candidate. We find robust evidence that relatives of current office-holders are more likely to be employed in better paying occupations

引用

页码：268 / 300

页数：33

共 63 条

[1] Family networks and school enrolment: Evidence from a randomized social experiment [J].