Markets and institutions in financial intermediation: National characteristics as determinants

被引:153
作者
Aggarwal, Raj [1 ]
Goodell, John W. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Akron, Dept Finance, Akron, OH 44325 USA
关键词
Financial institutions; Banks; Financial markets; Universal banks; Comparative financial systems; Legal traditions; Uncertainty avoidance; Trust; Property rights; CULTURE; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.03.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Given the importance of financial intermediation and the rise of globalization, there is little prior research on how national preferences for financial intermediation (markets versus institutions) are determined by cultural, legal, and other national characteristics. Using panel analysis for data on a recent 8-year period for 30 countries, this paper documents that national preferences for market financing increase with political stability. societal openness, economic inequality, and equity market concentration, and decreases with regulatory quality and ambiguity aversion. We confirm with robustness tests that our result for regulatory quality is independent of differences in national wealth and that our result for political stability is independent of both wealth and political legitimacy. These results should be of much interest to managers, scholars, regulators, and policy makers. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1770 / 1780
页数:11
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